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ABSTRACT
 
•
 
The legal debate over statutes which allow special treatment 
for child witnesses of sexual abuse has sparked recent 
discussion. These statutes permit the testimony of the children 
to be videotaped or transmitted via one- or two-way closed 
circuit television into the courtroom. Critics argue these 
statutes violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Right - to be confronted by the witnesses against him/her. 
Supporters feel these measures are necessary to protect the 
interests of young victims of sexual abuse. The goal of this 
. 
paper is to address the tension between society's interest in 
protecting child victims and the right of defendants to confront 
witnessed against them, discussing statutes, cases, and arguments 
concerning this issue. 
The paper "begins by introducing the problem of child sexual 
abuse, including the factors which contribute to the problem 
of under-reporting and the difficulties of prosecuting child 
sexual abuse cases. The next section, Statutory Comparison, 
presents the response of many state legislatures - various child 
protection statutes that permit modification of courtroom 
procedure in sexual abuse cases. The third section examines 
the cases which occurred as a result of these statutes, including 
two main Supreme Court cases - Coy v. Iowa and Maryland v. Craig. 
The arguments on both sides of this issue are then presented. 
Finally, the conclusion evaluates the current standing of the 
issue, realizing that this is an unsettled issue which is likely 
to continue to change and spark future debate. 
INTRODUCTION OF PROBLEM - Statistics 
In April of 1993, the National Committee for the Prevention 
of Child Abuse (NCPA) estimated that 2,936,000 cases of child 
abuse were reported to pubric social service/child protective 
services agencies in 1992 throughout America. Approximately 
17% of all cases reported were sexual abuse cases. This figure 
translates to nearly 500,0000 children reported for some sort 
of molestation or sexual abuse in 1992 (American Humane 
Association): 
As shown in the following table, 12,019 children in Illinois 
alone were reported for sexual abuse in 1992 (Illinois Department 
of Children and Family Services). 
Table 1 
Sexual Abuse Reported and Indicated 
Fiscal Years 1985 through 1992 
Flscal Children Children 
Year Reported Indicated 
14,000 
• caD=EN ~o l:l CHlOAEN.!tClICATEO I 
1985 8,131 4,734 
1986 8.396 4,868 
1987 9,n1 5,307 
1988 10,616 5,692 
1989 11,026 5,618 
1990 10,326 5,182 
1991 10,490 4,809 
1992 12,019 5,346 
Source:	 Child Abuse and Neglect Statistics, Annual Report Fiscal 
Year 1992. IL Department of Children and Family Services. 
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Recent statistics indicate that at least one in four 
•
 
American females and one in ten American males experience sexual 
victimization before the age of eighteen ("Rape Shield Laws ••• " 
1993). However, the incident rate of child sexual abuse is not 
fully known. Under-reporting of cases added to the secrecy 
and stigma that surround this issue makes most statistics 
unreliable. 
Under-reporting
• 
It is believed that the incidence of child sexual abuse 
is grossly under-reported; an estimated 100,000 to 500,00 
American children will be sexually abused a year (Russell 1983). 
other estimates have reached as high as 200,000 to 500,000 cases 
of sexual abuse perpetrated on female children alone (Collins 
1982). Statistics understate the problem because a substantial 
number of cases are never revealed. The main reason for the 
lack of reporting is that children do not reveal the incident. 
Children are the "perfect " targets because of this reluctance 
to disclose. Children are conditioned to comply with authority 
their whole lives. They are in a subordinate position and are 
fearful of threats. Also, children are susceptible to bribes 
and promises of reward. 
Additionally, they are more easily victimized because 
children are intensely curious, naive with regard to social 
2 
norms, and may respond willingly to intimate and gentle contact 
because they associate this with feelings of being loved. For 
these reasons, physical violence is rarely necessary or utilized 
(Yun 1983). Force is not necessarily used because the perpetrator 
is most often a child's authority figure and/or family member 
or friend, as shown by table 2. 
Detail Tables: Indicated Sexual Abuse 
Table 2 Fiscal Year 1992 
Perpetrators: Relationship to Victims 
Number Number Number 
RelationshIp Perpetrator. Male Female 
Natural Parent 
Step-Parent 
1,085 
457 
780 
446 
300 
11 
Other 1,099 873 68 
Parental Substitute 
Babysitter 
500 
424 
486 
383 
13 
40 
Sibling 
AuntlUncle 
. Adoptive Parent 
Foster Parent 
471 
417 
40 
16 
436 
402 
38 
13 
35 
15 
2 
3 
Day Care Provider 
Institutional Staff 
6 
14 
2 
11 
4 
2 
.Grandparents 180 164 16 
TOTAL 4,709 4,034 509 
eNote: Non-Duplicated Count 
166 perpetrators are of an unknown sex. 
Source:	 Child Abuse and Neglect Statistics, Annual Report Fiscal 
Year 1992, Illinois Department of Children and Family 
Services. 
Secrecy is enforced in cases where the child and the family 
know the abuser, which also adds to the child's reluctance to 
3 
reveal that he or she has been sexually abused. "A child is 
three times more likely to be molested by a recognized, trusted 
adult than by a stranger" (Summit p.182 1983). With sexual abuse 
often occurring in or near the home, the stigma and secrecy 
is enhanced and reporting diminished. The National Center on 
Child Abuse and Neglect asserts accurate statistics for child 
sexual abuse may never be obtained because it is possibly the 
most concealable form of child maltreatment (Russell p.183 1983). 
Obviou~ly, because most offenders are usually friends, 
neighbors, or family members of victims, the child molester 
is not the stereotypical low-life lurking about in a trenchcoat. 
Although many parents warn their children to stay away from 
strangers offering candy, few offenders wear raincoats and carry 
candy. Molesters come from all walks of life and all 
socioeconomic categories, and "they look just like the neighbor 
next door. They may even be the neighbor next door" (Yun 1983). 
Anyone, even members of the most respected professions, may 
commit sexual abuse upon children (Crewdson 1988). "Molesters 
cut across economic, social, and educational lines. They may 
be rich or poor, well-educated or ignorant, blue-collar or white, 
married or single" ("The Child Molester •. p.1 1984). Child 
molesters do not fall into one particular age group. Thus, 
there is no typical profile of a child molester. As tables 3 
and 4 (on the top of the next page) demonstrate, perpetrators 
fall into all race/ethnic groups and age groups. 
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Table 3 Perpetrators: Race/Ethnic Group 
Racel Number Number	 NumberEthnic Group Perpetrators Male Female 
•
 
White 2,776	 2,425 348Black 1,188	 1,052 122Hispanic 425	 393 28Other 31	 29 1Not Identified 289	 135 10TOTAL 4,709	 4,034 509 
'Note: ~on-Duplicated Count; male and female numbers 
do not Include 166 perpetrators whose sex is not known. 
Table 4 
Perpetrators: Age 
Number Number Number
Age Group Perpetrators Male Female 
Under 20 1,026 943 80 
20-29 922 792 127 
30.39	 1,349 1,149 197 
40-49 567 501 65 
50·59 238 222	 16 
60 or Older 169 163	 6 
Not Identified 438 264 18

TOTAL 4,709 4,034 509
 
°Note: Non-Duplicated Count; male and female numbers
 
do not include 166 perpetrators whose sex is not known.
 
Source:	 Child Abuse and Neglect Statistics, Annual Report Fiscal 
Year 1992. Illinois Department of Children and Family 
Services. 
Children of all socioeconomic backgrounds and ages are 
at risk of sexual abuse. The ages of victims range from early 
infancy (one to two months) to 17 to 18 years old. No particular 
age group is immune to sexual abuse, nor are the victims 
confined to any particular class (Sgroi 1975). Table 5 
illustrates that child victims are from both sexes and all ages 
and ethnic groups. 
5 
Graph 5	 Victims: Age, Sex. Race/Ethnic Group 
PercentChild Characterlala Number 
Age gf ChjJd 
0-2	 200 3.7 
3·5 1,080 20.2 
6-9 1,418 26.5 
10-13 1,459 27.3 
22.214-17 1,188 
~e not reported 1 0:0 
Sex of Child 
Boys 1,142 21.4 
78.4Girts 4,189 
Sex not reported 15 0.3 
CbOd's Ethnic Groye 
62.8Whit. 3,359 
Black 1,425 26.7 
Hispanic 447 8.4 
Other/not reported 115 2.1 
100.0TOTAL	 5,346 
Source:	 Child Abuse and Neglect Statistic, Annual Report Fiscal 
Year 1992. Illinois Department of Children and Family 
Services. 
The reluctance to report is also common on the part of 
the parent. Parents are often unwilling to believe or admit 
the possibility that their child has been sexually assaulted 
(Yun 1983). The unwillingness of parents to admit the occurrence 
of sexual abuse upon their children contributes both to 
under-reporting and to difficulty in prosecuting sexual abuse 
cases. Even if parents do report abuse, they are reluctant to 
proceed for two main reasons: (1) fear that justice will not 
be served because of the difficulty in successfully prosecuting 
sexual abuse cases and (2) fear that pursuing the case will 
further traumatize the child (Rogers 1980). 
6 
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(1) The first fear is justified by statistical evidence. 
In a 1969 study of 250 cases of child sex abuse that had been 
reported in to New York City's protective services, less than 
one percent of the molesters were sent to jail. A more recent 
study of sex offenders (238 men) in the Sexual Behavior Clinic 
of the New York State Psychiatric Institute showed that only 
50% had ever spent time in jail. These perpetrators had 
committed a total of 16,666 acts of child molestation, an average 
of 68.3 molestations per offender, according to the director 
of the clinic, Dr. Gene Abel (Collins 1982). A separate study 
by the American Psychological Association revealed that of the 
261 child sexual abuse cases tracked over a two-year period 
in the District of Columbia, only 8 cases actually came to trial 
(Rogers 1980). 
(2) The fear of traumatizing the child victim by reporting 
the abuse and pursuing prosecution is the second factor which 
deters parents from following through when a child discloses. 
Children may be traumatized by interviews and/or testifying 
in court. "Many researchers and commentators have suggested 
that the trauma associated with testifying in open court in 
the presence of the defendant, judge, and jury is nearly as 
great as that associated with the abuse itself" (Shaffer p.78 
1990). This trauma is sometimes referred to as the second 
victimization of the child, and it is the reason many cases 
never go to trial. 
7 
•
 
Difficulty in Prosecution 
Successful prosecution of child abuse so difficult for 
a number of reasons. Child Sexual abuse is an act rarely 
witnessed by others. It is very difficult to prove; lack of 
corroborative physical evidence is common. Therefore, 
prosecutors may often decide not to litigate a child sexual 
abuse case (Fields 1992). As earlier noted, parents often do 
not want their child to have to testify, making prosecution 
nearly impossible. Even when the child does testify in court, 
he or she is commonly met with skepticism, from the court and 
the public. An additional obstacle and fear of prosecutors is 
that children will be unable to provide adequate testimony 
(Nuce 1990). Many cases may come down to the victims word 
against the accused. Therefore, the prosecutor is forced to 
rely heavily on the testimony of the child (Cusick 1991). The 
child victim's testimony becomes crucial to obtaining convictions 
because their eyewitness testimony is usually the only direct 
link between the victim, the crime, and the offender (Forman 
1989). 
8
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STATUTORY COMPARISON 
In response to public outcries, state legislatures 
nationwide have been summoned to respond to the crisis of child 
sexual abuse (Shaffer 1990). 
Because of the unusual nature of child sexual abuse -­
the length of time over which it occurs, the lack of 
force or violence, the failure of the child to report 
or to seem traumatized -- and the subsequent difficulty 
of proving the offense, courts are liberalizing certain 
evidentiary rules and courtroom procedures. In 
recognition of this need for change, most state 
legislatures have enacted child protection statutes 
which permit certain modifications of courtroom 
procedure in sexual abuse cases" (Nuce 1990). 
Responding to growing public alarm, many states have 
adopted statutory measures that attempt to minimize the 
psychological trauma experienced by victims during the courtroom 
procedure (Cusick 1991). The result has been an array of child 
shield statutes. Many states allow the transmission of the 
child's testimony by one- or two-way closed-circuit television. 
Others permit the use of videotaped interviews of children 
witnesses (Nuce 1990). Many of these statutes also make it easier 
to prosecute child molesters. 
But this is not a new development. Since 1977 several states 
have enacted statutes allowing the testimony of sexually abused 
children to be videotaped. All but one of these statutes placed 
an age limit on the use of the procedure. The statutes also 
varied in three other areas: (1) the findings that must be 
9 
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made to have the child's testimony videotaped prior to the 
trial; (2) the procedures that must be followed while 
videotaping; (3) the findings that must be made in order to 
have the tape admitted into evidence at the trial 
(Weintraub 1985). 
By 1985, ten states had enacted statutes allowing for 
videotape depositions of child victims of sexual offenses 
(Kelly 1985). By 1989 that number had risen to twenty-seven 
states that had created statutes authorizing the videotaping 
of children's testimony. Additionally, twenty-one states had 
enacted provisions which permitted the use of one-way closed­
circuit televisions, one-way screens, and one-way mirrors 
(Forman 1989). Two years later, thirty-seven states had 
provisions for admission of videotaped testimony of a child; 
and thirty-one states allowed the use of closed-circuit 
television when taking a child's testimony (Lang 1991). 
But, just as in 1977, these statutes vary from state to 
state. Ordering the taping is one area where statutes differ. 
At least eight videotape statutes do not require that the court 
make a specific finding regarding the child's ability to testify 
at trial before ordering that the child's testimony be taped. 
For the most part, these statutes rely only on the request or 
motion by the prosecutor or the victim. On the other hand, 
statutes in at least five states provide that the child's 
testimony can be taped prior to the trial only if the court 
10
 
finds that the child is likely to suffer some degree of emotional 
harm if required to appear in court. Colorado and Wisconsin 
both have the latter type of statute, while Kentucky, Arizona, 
and Texas (virtually identical) require merely a request by 
the prosecutor. The Indiana statute does not mention the need 
for a court order prior to taping. The statutes of Maine, 
Montana, New Mexico, New York, and South Dakota require a case 
by case analysis of the possible trauma the child witness may 
suffer (Weintraub 1985). Texas and Kentucky statutes contain 
a separate provision. It specifies that during a videotaping 
session, "[t]he court shall permit the defendant to observe 
and hear the testimony of the child in person, but shall ensure 
that the child cannot hear or see the defendant" 
("The Testimony • •• " p.806 1985). The Iowa legislature's 
purpose was to "assure the fair and compassionate treatment 
of victims" and to "protect them from intimidation and further 
injury." The Iowa statute allows for a child to testify via 
closed-circuit television or by videotape (Shaffer 1990). 
Illinois does not have a statute that allows for procedural 
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause in the case of sexual 
abused children. According to Judge Charles Witte of the McLean 
County Circuit Court, videotaping and closed circuit testimony 
is not allowed because it violates the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Right (Witte 4/8/94). Illinois does 
appoint court guardians who will prepare child witnesses for 
1 1
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what to expect during the trial. Guardians show children around 
the courtroom and let them become more comfortable in their 
situation. Judge Witte added that he has let children testify 
while sitting in the lap of a parent or trusted adult, provided 
the adult does not physically influence the testimony of the 
child. 
12
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COURT RESPONSE TO STATUTES 
The various statutes, designed to facilitate the legal 
process and ease the pain of testifying in the presence of the 
accused, have caused controversy because they potentially 
conflict with the defendant's constitutional right to 
confrontation. (Shaffer 1990). The confrontation clause of the 
sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused sha~l enjoy the right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him • •• " (Fields 1990). But there is debate 
over the literal meaning of the confrontation clause and the 
original intent. The Founding Fathers' original intent of the 
Confrontation Clause is controversial. Justice Harlan stated 
in California v. Green 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970), "the 
Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment." He added, 
History seems to give us very little insight into 
the intended scope of the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause [because] ••• the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment is not one that we may 
assume the Framers understood as the embodiment of 
settled usage at common law (California v. Green p.158 
1970) • 
But, since Mattox v. United states, 156 U.S. 237, 244 in 1895, 
the Supreme Court has acknowledged the truth-finding purpose 
of the Confrontation Clau·se. Mattox was a landmark Supreme Court 
case on this issue. The opinion held that the practice of trying 
13
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defendants based on affidavits and depositions denied the 
defendant the opportunity to challenge his accuser face to face 
before a jury. Therefore, the purpose of the Confrontation 
Clause was interpreted to insure the witness makes a statement 
under oath, to force a cross examination of the witness, and 
to allow the jury to observe the witness' demeanor during 
testimony (Forman 1989). 
Yet, more recent rulings in the area of child sexual abuse 
have proven to be less stringent on the Confrontation Clause, 
particularly if there is reason to believe that testifying would 
be so traumatic to the child that he or she would be unable 
to communicate clearly in the courtroom. People v. Rivera 
(N.Y. Sup. 1988) held that it was sufficient for the court 
to make findings of necessity by its own conclusions and 
observations. In state v. Crandall (N.J. 1989) the opinion stated 
that in the absence of reasons to the contrary a child witness 
should be evaluated by a psychiatrist to determine potential 
trauma. Additionally, although the conviction was reversed in 
state v. Eaton (Kan. 1989) because the trial court erroneously 
held that the Kansas statute did not require a finding that 
the child witness would be traumatized such that the witness 
would be unable to communicate effectively to testify, the court 
upheld the constitutionality of the statute by implying a need 
requirement for future case (Shaffer 1990). In Florida, its 
Supreme Court found that the introduction at trial of a child 
14 
•
 
victim's videotaped testimony under section 92.53, Florida 
statutes, did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation 
(Lang 1991 ) • 
The United states Supreme Court, however, applied the 
Confrontation Clause more strictly than the above mentioned 
case rulings had in the important ruling, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.s. 
1012. 
Coy v. Iowa - THE CASE 
John Avery Coy was arrested 
'. 
in August of 1985. He was 
charged with sexually assaulting two thirteen-year-old girls. 
The state made a motion, at the trial of Coy, to allow the two 
girls to testify behind a screen or using closed-circuit 
television, to avoid further traumatizing the thirteen year 
olds. Because of an Iowa statutory procedure, the court allowed 
a large screen to be placed between the defendant and the girls 
while they testified. Neither of the girls could see the 
defendant, but Coy could see them faintly through the screen. 
After John Avery Coy was found guilty, he appealed; Coy attacked 
the constitutionality of the procedure in the state courts 
(Shaffer 1990). 
The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the statute, the procedure 
and the use of the screen (Forman 1989). Therefore, the Supreme 
Court of Iowa affirmed Coy's Conviction (State v. Iowa 1986). 
15 
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Coy then sought review by the Supreme Court. The United States 
Supreme Court reversed the decision. The Court ruled that 
the use of the screen violated the defendant's rights under 
the Confrontation Clause (Shaffer 1990). 
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION - The Majority Opinion 
By a 6-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction of Coy. In Coy, the majority opinion was delivered 
by Justice Scalia. Joining in the majority opinion were Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, Stevens, and White. Justice 
O'Connor filed a concurring opinion which was joined by Justice 
White. The dissent was filed by Justice Blackmun and was joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Although Justice Kennedy had been 
appointed at this time, he did not participate in the decision 
(Shaffer 1990). 
The majority found that the defendant's right to 
face-to-face confrontation had been violated in this case. 
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that the clause guarantees 
a criminal defendant the right to confront witnesses giving 
evidence against him (or her) at the trial (Coy v. Iowa, 487 
U.S. p.1016 1988). The Court rejected the argument from the 
state that the necessity of protecting the victims of sexual 
abuse outweighed the right of confrontation (Coy, p.1021 1988). 
The majority asserted that the use of the screen during the 
1 6 
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girls testimony made the defendant appear guilty, therefore 
denying the defendant the presumption of innocence. The majority 
opinion exclaimed "It is difficult to imagine a more obvious 
violation of the defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter." 
Scalia traced the history of the right to confront witnesses 
and concluded that "there is something deep in human nature 
that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and 
accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution'" 
(Coy, p.102q 1988). Justice Scalia also described the 
"irreducible literal meaning" of the Confrontation clause as 
the "'right to meet face to face all those who appear and give 
evidence at the trial'" (Coy, p.1020 1988). 
This was the first time that the Court had conclusively 
stated that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendants 
the right to a face-to-face meeting with the witnesses against 
them. The majority did acknowledge that "face-to-face presence 
may, unfortunately, upset the truthful ••• abused child • • " 
(Coy, p.1021 1988). But, Scalia added confrontation may also 
reveal a child witness who has been coached by a malevolent 
adult. Justice Scalia stated, "It is a truism that constitutional 
protections have costs (Coy, p.1021 1988). 
Scalia continued by addressing the States suggestion that 
the confrontation interest was outweighed by the necessity of 
protecting the victims. He acknowledged that the Court has, 
in the past, indicated that the "rights conferred by the 
17 
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Confrontation Clause are not absolute and may give way to other 
important interests" (Coy, p.1022 1988). But, he asserted the 
rights referred to in those cases were not the rights explicitly 
set forth in the Confrontation Clause. The rights which may 
give way to other interests are the reasonably implicit rights 
of the Confrontation Clause, such as the right to cross-examine 
or the right to exclude out-of-court statements. Scalia 
continues, 
To hold that our determination of what implications are 
reasonable must take into account other important 
interests is not the same as holding that we can 
identify exceptions, in light of other important 
interests, to the irreducible literal meaning of the 
Clause: 'a right to meet face to face all those who 
appear and give evidence at trial' (Coy, p.1022 1988). 
Justice Scalia adds, "We leave for another day, however, the 
question whether any exceptions exist" (Coy, p.1022 1988). He 
refutes the State's argument that an exception should be allowed 
in this case to further the important public policy established 
by the Iowa statute. He argues 
Our cases suggest that even as to exceptions from the 
normal implications of the Confronation Clause, as 
opposed to its most literal application, something more 
than the type of generalized finding underlying such a 
statute is needed (Coy, p.1022 1988). 
Therefore, Scalia concluded, because there has been no 
individualized finding that the witnesses is this case needed 
special protection, "the judgement here could not be sustained 
by any concevable exception" (Coy, p.102 1988). 
18 
The Concurring Opinion 
Justice O'Connor, while agreeing that Coy's confrontation 
rights were violated in this particular situation, added that 
Confrontation Clause rights may give way in an
 
appropriate case to other competing interests so
 
as to permit the use of certain procedural devices
 
designed to shield a child witness from the trauma
 
of courtroom testimony (Coy, p.1025 1988).
 
Justice O'Connor stressed in her concurrence that the majority 
opinion did not "doom such efforts by state legislatures to 
protect child witnesses" (Coy,p.1025 1988). O'Connor felt Coy's 
confrontation rights were violated because requirements of the 
clause may give way if the court makes a case-specific finding, 
and the Iowa Supreme Court made no such finding. The Court has 
consistently maintained the Confrontation Clause merely reflects 
a preference for a face-to-face meeting, according to Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence; thus, she stressed the clause is not 
absolute. The significant societal problems that child sexual 
abuse prosecution encounters are elaborated in the concurrence. 
Because of these obstacles, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that 
one-half of the states have statutes allowing child testimony 
via one- or two-way closed circuit television (Coy, p.1024 1988). 
She noted that many of these statutes raise no confrontation 
rights violation claim, since testimony is taken in the presence 
of the accused. Arguing against the literal right to 
19 
face-to-face confrontation as absolute, O'Connor adds that it 
may give way to an "important public policy" in the case where 
a court makes a "case-specific finding of necessity." Regarding 
a case-specific finding of necessity, O'Connor favored each 
case and child witness be individually analyzed to determine 
the amount of trauma which would be inflicted, the child's 
ability to testify, and whether a procedural exception (such 
as videotaping) would be necessary. 
Justic~ O'Connor states that the protection of child 
witnesses is, in her opinion, "just such a policy." The Justice 
pointed out that protecting child witnesses is a compelling 
state interest, according to precedent set by Globe Newspaper 
Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk County (457 u.s. 596, 607 
- 1982) • Therefore, according to the concurrence, if there 
is an individualized finding of potential trauma to the child 
witness in a sexual abuse case the confrontation clause may 
be secondary. In conclusion, Justice O'Connor offered an 
important guideline - followed by many state courts since the 
Coy v. Iowa decision. She predicted that in future cases "[tlhe 
primary focus .•• will likely be on the necessity prong, whether 
the procedure used is necessary to further an important state 
interest" (Coy, p.1025 1988). 
20 
The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Blackmun 
and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. The opinion expressed 
strong disagreement with the majority's analysis of the 
Confrontation Clause in the case of Coy (Forman 1989). Justice 
Blackmun found no sixth amendment violation. The dissent 
expressed that "the ability of a witness to see the defendant 
while the w~tness is testifying does not constitute an essential 
part of the protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause" 
(Coy, p.1027 1988). Like Justice O'Connor, Justice Blackmun 
followed the view that the confrontation clause merely asserts 
a preference for face-to-face confrontation. The dissent 
elaborated on the important state interests underlying the Iowa 
statute and the effect fear and trauma has on the testimony 
of a witness, thus undermining truth-finding process of the 
trial (Forman 1989). Also agreeing with the concurrence, the 
dissent asserts that protecting child witnesses is an important 
public policy that outweighs the right of the defendant. 
However, unlike Justice O'Connor, the dissent rejected the 
case-by-case inquiry requirement when deciding is such procedures 
were necessary. In conclusion, Justice Blackmun wrote that 
the procedure authorized by the Iowa statute was constitutionally 
upheld; thus, Coy's conviction should not have been overturned. 
21 
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ANALYSIS OF THE COY OPINIONS 
In cases where the violation of a right guaranteed by a 
constitutional amendment is in question, the Supreme Court 
asserts that the state must have a compelling reason for 
infringing upon that right. This standard of strict scrutiny 
was first established in Justice Stone's footnote four of United 
states v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The burden 
is placed upon the government to prove that there is a compelling 
public interest at stake that should take precedence over the 
individual constitutional right (Murphy, et. ale p.689 1986). 
In Coy, the welfare of child victims and protecting them 
from trauma is the public interest. The Majority opinion finds 
the defendant's constitutional right takes precedence over this 
public interest. In this case, the public interest is not 
compelling enough to measure up to the test of strict scrutiny. 
Justice Scalia states that the right to confrontation is 
explicitly set forth in the Sixth Amendment and cannot be 
outweighed by a generalized finding that child witnesses 
experience trauma. Although Scalia "leave[s] for another day 
••• the question whether exceptions exist," his absolutist 
language used in the decision demonstrates his position on this 
future question. Justice Scalia, who most likely included that 
statement to gain the support Justice O'Connor and Justice White, 
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believes in the literal application of the Confrontation Clause 
and the need for face-to-face confrontation. 
But, Justice O'Connor's concurrence asserts the importance 
of protecting child witnesses. In her conclusion she states, 
But if a court makes a legislative finding of necessity, 
as is required by a number of state statutes, our cases 
suggest that the strictures of the Confrontation Clause 
many give way to the compelling state interest of 
protecting child witnesses (Coy p.1018 1988). 
O'Connor's concurrence, which Justice White joined, indicates 
they joined ~he majority because there was no case specific 
finding of necessity in this ca~e. 
The Dissenting opinion views protection of child witnesses 
as an important public policy. Justice Blackmun's view is that 
this important public policy outweighs "the narrow Confrontation 
Clause right at issue here-- the 'preference' for having the 
defendant within the witness' sight while the witness testifies" 
(Coy, p.1031 1988). He adds, disagreeing with the concurrence, 
that it should not be necessary to show in each case that a 
special procedure is needed to protect the welfare of the child, 
the state should not be required to make a predicate showing 
in each case. 
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IMPACT OF COY V. IOWA 
The impact of Coy has created confusion for the lower courts 
in determining what exceptions, if indeed there are any, to 
the Confrontation Clause are constitutionally acceptable (Nuce 
1990). 
Citing Coy, many states have upheld the constitutionality 
of their child witness statutes. On the other hand, other states 
have declared there child witness statutes to be 
unconstitutional. But, considering the ambiguity of Coy and 
its unique facts and divergent decisions, this varied reaction 
from the state courts is natural, although problematic 
(Shaffer 1990). While some commentators and courts declare 
that the Coy decision from the Supreme Court calls for a per 
se standard demanding face-to-face confrontation in all child 
sexual abuse cases, other state courts have relied on the 
concurrence of Justice O'Connor and created their own 
interpretations (Nuce 1990). 
The case of Robert James Tafoya demonstrates this route. 
The defendant was convicted of several sexual offenses 
perpetrated against six young girls (and one adult woman). 
The state had a procedural exception statute which the court 
allowed to be utilized at the trial. The statute provided for 
the child victims to testify via videotape. The defendant 
watched from a control booth, so the witnesses could not see 
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him, as the testimony was taped. This satisfied, according 
to trial court, the statute's provision that the deposition 
be taken" in the presence of ••• the defendant." Tafoya 
could see the witnesses and communicate with his attorney. 
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico affirmed the conviction 
of Tafoya prior to Coy, finding no violation of the Confrontation 
Clause or the procedure mandated by the statute. New Mexico's 
highest court denied certiorari. But, the United states Supreme 
Court gran~ed the writ of certiorari, and in light of Coy, 
vacated and remanded the case for further consideration. The 
state court once again affirmed Tafoya's conviction on remand. 
The court ruled that because there was ample evidence that 
established the child witnesses would be traumatized if required 
to testify in the presence of the defendant and in open court, 
Tayfoya was differentiated from Coy. Therefore, while the New 
Mexico court acknowledged Justice Scalia's opinion of the 
majority, it placed more weight in Justice O'Connor's concurrence 
(Shaffer 1990). This was the standard followed by many state 
courts after the Coy decision. Critics of this standard claim 
states are "carving out their own interpretations of Coy •• 
camouflaged by case law and nibbled by necessity" with the 
essential rights guaranteed to the accused being jeopardized 
(Shaffer p.807 1990) Shortly after, the Supreme Court followed 
this trend of the state courts as demonstrated by the next 
important case Maryland v. Craig (497 U.S. 836; S. ct. 3157). 
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Maryland v. Craig - THE CASE 
In October 1986, a Howard County grand jury charged Sandra 
Ann Craig with child abuse, first and second degree sexual 
offenses, perverted sexual practice, assault, and battery. 
The victim named in each count was a six-year-old girl who had 
attended, from August 1984 until June 1986, the kindergarten 
and pre-kindergarten center operated by Craig. In March 1987 
Craig was tried in a Maryland court on several charges for 
sexually abusing the six-year-old child. Before the trial began, 
the court approved the testimony of the child witness, including 
the examination and cross-examination by the prosecutor and 
defense counsel, taking place in another room. In the adjacent 
courtroom, the child's testimony was transmitted to the jury, 
judge, and defendant. Craig, the defendant, could communicate 
with her attorney by a private telephone line. Craig was 
convicted on charges of first degree sexual assault after a 
twelve day trial (G. Fields 1992). 
The court rejected Craig's objection that the use of a 
one-way television procedure violated the Confrontation Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment. The State Court of Special Appeals 
affirmed, but the State Court of Appeals reversed. The case 
was then argued before the Supreme Court on April 18, 1990 and 
decided on June 27, 1990. 
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THE SUPREME COURT DECISION - The Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court examined whether the use of the one-way 
closed circuit television, in the case of child abuse victims, 
violates the Confrontation Clause (G. Fields 1990). Justice 
O'Connor delivered the majority opinion. She was joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice Blackmun, and 
Justice Kennedy. The majority approved of child testimony 
via one-way closed circuit television when there were 
individualized findings that child victims would suffer severe 
trauma in testifying. In asserting that the right to face-to­
face confrontation is' not absolute, the majority took a "liberal 
constructionist" approach in interpreting the confrontation 
clause (Fields 1990). Justice O'Connor stated that a finding 
of necessity coupled with the state's interest in protecting 
child witnesses from trauma was so compelling in the case of 
Craig that the trial court was justified in obtaining the child 
witness's testimony by the use of the one-way closed circuit 
television. The Court held that the procedure was not 
categorically prohibited by the Confrontation Clause, and the 
child was not required to be in the presence of the defendant 
to determine if he or she would be traumatized (Maryland v. 
Craig, p.852 1990). While O'Connor admitted that the face-to-face 
confrontation is the core of the Confrontation Clause, she 
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countered that "it is not the sine non of the confrontation 
right" (Craig, p.853 1990). 
The majority held that Maryland's procedure preserved 
elements of confrontation. Although the procedure prevented 
the child from seeing the defendant, it "adequately ensure[d] 
the testimony was both reliable and subject[ed] to adversial 
test in a manner functionally equivalent to that accorded live, 
in-person testimony." Therefore, the court felt the use of 
the one-way.closed circuit television did "not impinge upon 
the Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking or symbolic purposes" 
(Craig, p.852 1990). 
Justice O'Connor stressed that an adequate showing of 
necessity was qemonstrated in Craig, which was the important 
element missing in Coy. Referring to her concurrence in Coy, 
Justice O'Connor stated, 
That the face-to face confrontation requirement is not 
absolute does not mean that it may easily by dispensed 
with. As we suggested in Coy, our precedents confirm 
that a defendant's right to confront accustory witnesses 
may be satisfied absent physical, face-to-face confron­
tation at trial where denial of such confrontation is 
necessary to further an important public policy ••• 
(Craig, p.855 1990). 
Justice O'Connor added that the admission of hearsay exceptions 
demonstrate the mere preference for confrontation and not an 
absolute guarantee (Craig, p.856 1990). 
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The Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Scalia dissented and was joined by Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, and Stevens. The dissent begins "Seldom has this 
Court failed so conspicuously to sustain a categorical guarantee 
of the Constitution against the tide of prevailing current 
opinion" (Craig, p.861 1990). Justice Scalia goes on to stress 
the fundamental nature of the right to confront physically the 
witness durirg the trial. Looking to Kentucky v. Stincer 482 
u.S. 730; 107 S. Ct. 2658, Scalia argues that the Court has 
"never doubted that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the 
defendant a face-to-face meeting with the witnesses appearing 
before the trier of fact" (Craig, p.861 1990). The dissent 
recognizes the majority's attempt to draw comparison to 
traditional hearsay precedents to create an exception to the 
Confrontation Clause. But, Scalia counters that exceptions, 
in general, hinge on a finding of unavailability of the witness. 
Justice Scalia suggests the majority opinion is a 
"subordination of explicit constitutional text to current favored 
policy" (Craig, p.863 1990). Following this line of argument 
Scalia adds, "Because the text of the Sixth Amendment is clear, 
and because the Constitution is meant to protect against, rather 
than conform to, current 'widespread belief,' I respectfully 
dissent" (Craig, p.864 1990). 
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Justice Scalia concludes, 
The Court today has applied interest-balancing 
analysis where the text of the Constitution simply 
does not permit it. We are not free to conduct a 
cost-benefit analysis of clear and explicit constitutional 
guarantees, and then to adjust their meaning to comport 
with our findings. The Court has convincingly proved 
that the Maryland procedure serves a valid interest, and 
gives the defendant virtually everything the Confrontation 
Clause guarantees (everything, that is, except 
confrontation). I am persuaded, therefore, that the 
Maryland procedure is virtually constitutional. Since 
it is not, however, actually constitutional I would 
affirm the judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals 
reversing the judgment of conviction (Craig, p.870 1990). 
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ANALYSIS OF CRAIG OPINIONS 
In this case the majority rules in favor of an exception 
to the Confrontation Clause. Justice O'Connor, for the Majority, 
reiterates her support of the compelling interest society has 
in protecting the welfare of child victims. She writes, 
We likewise conclude that a State's interest in the 
physical and psychological well-being of child abuse 
victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, 
at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face 
his or her accusers in court (Craig p.8S3 1990). 
The difference between the,two cases is that a case specific 
finding is called for in the Maryland statute. The majority 
ruled that the state made an adequate showing of necessity in 
this case, thereby justifying the use of a special procedure. 
This case specific factor is what seems to have lured over 
Justice White and Justice O'Connor and why this case turned 
out differently than Coy. 
The dissent, on the other hand, does not believe the 
Confrontation Clause should be violated or that the strict 
scrutiny can be lowered to an interest balancing evaluation. 
Justice Scalia asserts, 
I have no need to defend the value of confrontation 
because the Court has no authority to question it. It 
is not within our charge to speculate that 'where face­
to-face confrontation causes emotional distress in a child 
witness,' confrontation might 'in fact disserve the 
Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking goal' .•• For good 
or bad, the Sixth Amendment requires confrontation, and 
we are not at liberty to ignore it (Craig, p.870 1990). 
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Justice Scalia sticks to his literal interpretation of 
the Confrontation Clause in his Craig dissent which he asserted 
in his majority opinion in Coy. While he did concede to some 
exceptions from past cases to the Confrontation Clause in Coy, 
Scalia excluded face-to-face confrontation as a possible 
exception because it was explicit in the text of the Sixth 
Amendment. 
This case is the "day" when the court answered the "question 
whether any'exceptions exist" to this literal right to face-to­
face confrontation. As Justice, Scalia indicated in Coy, when 
it comes to the literal application of the Confrontation Clause, 
the face-to-face confrontation, he answered (in his dissenting 
opinion) No. Scalia stated that an exception cannot be granted. 
Likewise, as she indicated in her concurring opinion in Coy, 
Justice O'Connor replied Yes. O'Connor believes in a case where 
an exception to face-to-face confrontation is necessary to 
further an important public policy, a case specific exception 
should be allowed. 
Although Craig is the current precedent on this issue, it 
is tentative one. The court is almost equally divided on this 
issue and could rule differently in future cases, depending 
on the circumstances and the opinions of incoming justices. 
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THE AFTERMATH OF Maryland V. Craig 
In this case the Supreme Court approved of a procedure 
which struck a balance in favor of protecting children involved 
in child sexual abuse cases. Maryland v. Craig created an 
exception to the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and 
established child sexual abuse victims as a class of witnesses 
who may testify at a trial while avoiding face-to-face 
confrontati~n (Cusick 1991). 
While children's rights advocates and prosecutors rejoice 
in this decision, the ruling has met criticism. Some critics 
predict that prosecutors will attempt to invoke a similar statute 
and procedure whenever the presence of the defendant renders 
a child's testimony "ineffective." This would force trial courts 
to interpret Craig liberally on behalf of child witnesses. 
Critics fear that used in this manner, the exception set forth 
in Craig "becomes a prosecutorial sword which may put many 
innocent defendants behind bars" (Cussick p.967 1991). Similar 
to sentiments expressed by Justice Scalia in his dissent, part 
of the difficult in accepting the Craig opinion is that it is 
motivated by public opinion rather than legal analysis of 
constitutional right. It appears to many critics of the 
majority's decision in this case that public policy concerns 
motivated the Court and an exception was created where none 
could be easily found in current law (Bainor 1990). One author 
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compares the extreme public response to the media attention 
focused on child sexual abuse to the Salem witch hunts and 
McCarthy's Red Scare (Cusick 1991). 
The Craig decision also generated additional problems. 
The decision seems to have left legal and practical questions 
unanswered (Lang 1991). Specifically, Craig does not clarify 
what the level of evidence needed to invoke the exception and 
the characteristics of the class entitled to its protection 
(Cusick 1991). Although this case created guidelines, issues 
regarding similar statutes remain. Additionally, uncertainty 
as to whether the decision in this case will facilitate future 
and further exceptions-continues (Fields 1990). In general, 
Craig provides little guidance on when and if statutory 
procedures should be utilized. This has resulted in a continuing 
struggle for the state courts and legislatures (Montoya 1992). 
Therefore, it is unlikely that this case represents the final 
challenge to these statutes or the final decision on this legal 
controversy (Lang 1991). 
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PRO DEFENDANT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ARGUMENT 
The strongest defense against videotaped and closed circuit 
testimony of children is that it is a violation of the 
defendant's constitutional right. "Sacrificing the rights of 
the accused for the comfort of the victim is an unprecendented 
step in the wrong direction," claims Randall Shaffer in the 
Kentucky Law Journal. He asserts that although the goal is 
legitimate, ~he procedure is flawed; closed-circuit or videotaped 
testimony infringes on the defendant's constitutional right 
to confrontation (Shaffer 1990). Although most critics agree 
that there is a need to protect children in these cases, they 
argue that the right to be confronted is one of the personal 
liberties guaranteed within the Bill of Rights (Fields 1992). 
Additionally, prosecution is difficult in sexual abuse cases, 
but "[slociety's need to prosecute accused abusers is no greater 
than its need to preserve the Constitution '~Nuce 1990). 
The truth finding value of face-to-face confrontation is 
another argument against video~ape and closed circuit statutes. 
The jury is denied the chance to witness and evaluate the 
demeanor of the child witness in the presence of the accused 
if the testimony is shown by closed circuit television or from 
a videotape (Shaffer 1990). By allowing this type of testimony, 
the jury cannot accurately assess the trustworthiness of the 
testimony and the credibility of the witness (Fields 1990). 
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PRO CHILD VICTIM ARGUMENT 
Supporters of legislation that allows taped or televised 
testimony refute the argument that this type of testimony 
violates the defendant's constitutional rights. One point 
asserted is that when the Confrontation Clause was ratified, 
television did not exist (Montoya 1992). "When the Framers 
constructed the Confrontation Clause, they had neither child 
witnesses nor closed circuit television in mind" 
(Fields p.167 1990). Children were labeled incompetent and 
television was not invented. 
The compelling state interest of protecting children is 
a second argument. Because sexual abuse is a growing societal 
problem, concessions are vital. "In the face of growing awareness 
of the national problem of child sexual abuse, the modification 
of defendants' confrontation rights under narrowly defined 
circumstances should be held constitutional" (Nuce p.581 1990). 
This argument asserts that protecting the children is a 
compelling interest of such great magnitude that it overrides 
the sixth amendment right to Confrontation. This is a balancing 
of interests method and the balance is struck in favor of the 
child and the society over the defendant. 
Avoiding inflicting further trauma upon child witnesses 
is a strong argument supporting these statutes. The threat 
of additional psychological damage to a child if the child is 
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are easily influenced and led, making them less reliable 
witnesses. 
It is well recognized that children are more highly 
suggestible than adults. Sexual activity, with the 
aura of mystery that adults create about it, confuses 
and fascinates them. Moreover they have, of course, 
no real understanding of the serious consequences of 
the charges they make ••• " (Yun p.1746 1983). 
Supporters of confrontational testimony by victims of sexual 
abuse also refute the inevitability of trauma being inflicted 
upon the chi~d by the courtroom situation. Empirical evidence 
has proven inconclusive. Psychological studies of actual victims 
have shown that it is quite difficult to distinguish between 
the trauma caused by the abuse itself and the trauma from the 
experience in the courtroom (Forman 1989). "Some children report 
feeling empowered by their participation in the process. Some 
have complained, when the offender plead guilty, that they did 
not have an opportunity to be heard in court" (Montoya 1992). 
While this is not true in all cases, physically confronting 
the accused can be therapeutic for the victim. Although any 
child who has been sexually abused will find it difficult or 
traumatizing to testify, the same can be said of adult rape 
victims or murder witnesses or any of a number of witnesses 
to various crimes. This is a tragic aspect of our judicial 
system, but it is nonetheless vital to the truth finding process 
(Shaffer 1990). 
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statutes that allow exceptions to the Confrontation Clause 
for children also violate another tenant of our judicial system, 
the presumption of innocence. The argument that testifying in 
front of a perpetrator will be traumatic for the victim assumes 
guilt inasmuch as it assumes a victim and a perpetrator (Montoya 
1992). Those who support confrontational testimony by victims 
of sexual abuse argue that "to abrogate a defendant's right 
to confrontation compromises the foundation of the American 
judicial sys~em [because] the presumption of innocence is a 
hallmark of our judicial system" (Nuce 1990). 
An additional point which has recently been sensationalized 
in the media is the possibility that children lie or fabricate 
stories of abuse. The popular belief that a child will not 
be able to testify in front of the accused due to trauma or 
fear assumes the child is telling the truth. "This reasoning 
is not only illogical, it is unconstitutional" (Shaffer 1990). 
A Denver study in 1987 found that 8% of sexual abuse reports 
were purely fictitious and an additional 22% were unsupported 
by evidence. Furthermore, a University of Michigan study found 
that charges of sexual abuse were raised in approximately 30% 
of Michigan's contested child custody cases (Nuce 1990). 
Allegations of abuse commonly arise in divorce and/or custody 
proceedings. Studies indicate that the likelihood of false 
accusations of sexual abuse increases dramatically in divorce 
and custody situations (Montoya 1992). Additionally, children 
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forced to testify in court in the presence of the defendant 
motivates many of these statutes. Psychologists believe that 
the psychological damage is caused by both the sexual abuse 
and the subsequent events, such as the reaction of the family, 
repeatedly having to talk about the abuse, and testifying in 
court (Bainor 1990). "Only a rare child could fail to be 
traumatized by the experience of testifying in court" 
(Cusick p.967 1991). In some cases the horror of reliving 
the abuse is intensified by the child's fear that the accused, 
who possibly threatened the child during the sexual abuse, will 
attack them in the courtroom (Nuce 1990). Children are, 
therefore, forced to cope with the trauma of the sexual abuse 
and the stress of the courtroom experience. Often, 
"system-induced trauma" occurs and children may end up 
contradicting themselves. Overall, the stress forced on the 
victim and the family can result in additional psychological 
damage during prosecution (Nuce 1990). One of the major reasons 
sexual abuse cases never make it to trial is because the parents 
are unwilling to further traumatize their children by forcing 
them to participate in a courtroom procedure (Bainor 1990). 
Supporters of shielding statutes argue that the state has an 
interest in protecting young children from the trauma of repeated 
appearances and extended testimony in open court in the presence 
of the alleged assailant. Therefore, a trial judge should allow 
testimony to be transmitted by videotape or television if 
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testifying in open court would inflict substantial trauma upon 
the witness (liThe Testimony . • 1985). 
In addition to the reduction of trauma rationale, some 
supporters feel these procedures actually improve the truth­
finding process. Not only does videotaping protect the child 
witness from continually having to repeat their testimony, it 
also allows the child to withdraw early from the court 
proceedings and secures the child's testimony against 
forgetfulness and retraction (liThe Testimony of Child .. " 1985). 
Because in many cases the prosecutions strongest evidence is 
the testimony of the child, it is important the testimony be 
intelligible. But, guilt, fear, and trauma may undermine the 
child witness's ability to testify effectively (Forman 1989). 
Supporters, who favor closed circuit televised testimony, argue 
that permitting victims to testify via closed circuit television 
is the best way to " e ffectuate the state's interest in 
prosecuting these cases without diminishing the defendant's 
confrontation rights • .• " (Bainor p.996 1990). While the other 
side argues that confrontation elicits truth, an argument can 
be made that when confrontation causes significant emotional 
distress in a child, such a confrontation would actually disserve 
the Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking goal. "If the child 
is telling the truth, the fact-finding process will be better 
served by making testifying less stressful II (Montoya p1259 1992). 
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An additional argument favoring the use of videotaped 
depositions for child witnesses is that videotape is uniquely 
qualified to present the demeanor of the child witness as he 
or she gives the statement. The jury is better able to assess 
the credibility of the witness because the child is less upset, 
frightened, shy, or humiliated, and therefore, the jury is 
provided with a more accurate and less emotional deposition 
(Kelly 1985). Taping may also preserve the child's statements 
while fresh in the child's mind and reduce the number of times 
the witness has to repeat the testimony (Fields 1990). 
Similarly, closed-circuit television also allows the jury to 
better assess the child's testimony. Closed-circuit is sometime 
favored because it is instantaneous and "the substantive concern 
of the confrqntation clause remain fully protected" 
(Bainor 1990). An important note is that cross-examination is 
still utilized during this procedure. 
Supporters of protective statutes also refute the claim 
that children are not credible witnesses. 
Distrust of children is illogical in child sexual 
abuse prosecutions because false accusations are 
extremely rare. Studies have reported the fabrication 
rate to be between two and five percent. The majority 
of false reports are adult initiated 
("Rape Shield Laws .• " p. 751 1993). 
For the most part, children lack the requisite knowledge 
to fabricate sexual stories. Additionally, they are not likely 
to lie to their parents or authority figures about sexual abuse 
(Cusick 1991). False accusations are most prominent during 
divorce proceedings and custody disputes. 
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CONCLUSION 
This issue of the welfare of the child victim versus the 
rights of the defendant still remains unsettled. It is an ever 
changing area of the law. After some rather ambiguous Supreme 
Court decisions, the burden of the issue has once again shifted 
back to the state level. At the state level, interpretation, 
procedure, and the balance of interests varies from state to 
state. 
Alternatives do exist to these child witness statutes which 
would alleviate the trauma suffered by child witnesses yet 
preserve the rights of the accused. One suggestion is to place 
special priority on sex abuse cases on the docket to reduce 
the amount of time the child spends in the judicial system. 
Another alternative is to coordinate joint investigative effort 
in following up reports of sexual abuse. This coordination 
decreases the time and trauma of the child getting interviewed 
repeatedly, having to relive over and over the details of the 
abuse (Shaffer 1990). Currently, in advocacy centers across 
Illinois and the nation, such as McLean County's Child Protection 
Network, these coordination efforts are being attempted. The 
police, the Department of Children and Family Services, and 
the State's Attorney's Office all work together to eliminate 
repeat interviews and speed up the investigative process. 
From interning at the McLean County Child Protection 
Network, I have seen firsthand the unsettling effect . 
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confrontation has upon children's testimony. One little girl 
on the witness stand looked over at her father, the defendant, 
before answering every question. During her testimony she became 
very flustered and upset. Because Illinois does not have a 
statute that allows for special procedures with child witnesses, 
it was necessary for this little girl to face her father during 
her testimony. 
Illinois needs to place greater public policy emphasis 
on the sexua~ abuse of children and the welfare of children, 
in general. The current system is adult based and does not 
take into consideration the needs of child victims and witnesses. 
If the legislature refuses to design a statute which allows 
for closed circuit or videotaped testimony, it should develop 
an alternative which takes into consideration child witnesses. 
Suggestions have included child designed courtrooms, which 
are less intimidating and arranged so that the defendant is 
not in the child's direct line of sight, and child advocates 
which assist the children in preparing for the court experience. 
Some improvements have been made in Illinois, such as the 
development of Child Advocacy Centers, but additional reform 
is vital. 
Additional research in the area of child witnesses and 
the Confrontation Clause would be very beneficial. A state 
by state comparison of the current statutes in this area is 
one possibility. This type of study could compare the 
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guidelines, restrictions, and procedures utilized by different. 
This type of analysis may be able to determine who has the most 
successful statute and/or provide a model for other states. 
One aspect not yet touched upon is the importance of 
prevention. Child sexual abuse perpetuates itself, it is 
important to stress that more than eighty percent of child sexual 
abusers were themselves abused. Legislatures need to concentrate 
on creating legislation that will target prevention (Shaffer 
1990). At the same time, victims of sexual abuse obviously 
need special treatment within our judicial system today. These 
victims are so vulnerable; "arguably, the fabric of society 
is revealed from the way these most· vulnerable victims are 
treated" (Montoya 1992). Yet, as the debate between Sixth 
Amendment confrontation rights and protecting child witnesses 
continues, it remains to be seen how these victims (and these 
defendants) will be treated in the future. 
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